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is particularly devastating because it generally cannot be appealed except
on grounds of fraud or mistake.5 The Hollen decision should serve as a
warning to attorneys lest they find themselves in the predicament of having inadvertently disposed of their client's cause of action.
Cathleen G. Randall
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-Standard of Care-Physician
Not Liable for Undertaking Particular Mode of
Treatment If Reasonable and Prudent
Practitioner Would Have Followed
Same Procedure Under Similar
Circumstances
Hood v. Phillips,
554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977).
Sheldon D. Hood brought suit against Dr. John R. Phillips, alleging that
he had sustained injuries as a result of surgery which was not a medically
acceptable form of treatment for emphysema. Dr. Phillips testified that he
had performed this surgery for years, achieving beneficial results for
eighty-five percent of his patients. He did, however, concede that this
mode of treatment was highly controversial and not generally accepted by
the medical profession. Expert testimony revealed that the usual treatment for emphysema was nonsurgical, and that Dr. Phillips' method had
been abandoned as ineffectual. The trial court entered judgment for Dr.
Phillips after the jury refused to find him grossly negligent. The court of
civil appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the case should have
been submitted on a theory of ordinary negligence. Both parties appealed
to the Texas Supreme Court. Held-Affirmed on other grounds. A physician undertaking a particular mode of treatment is not liable for harm
caused thereby if a reasonable and prudent medical practitioner would
have followed the same procedure under similar circumstances.'
proval of counsel will not be permitted to override or supersede positive recitals of judgment
itself, so as to convert it into judgment by consent).
54. Gravel v. Alaskan Village, Inc., 409 P.2d 983, 986 (Alaska 1966); Rocks v. Brosius,
217 A.2d 531, 541 (Md. 1966): Boyd v. Boyd. 545 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1976, no writ); Akin v. Akin, 417 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1967,
no writ); Alexander v. Alexander, 373 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1963,
no writ).
1. Hood v. Phillips, 537 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976), aff'd on
other grounds, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977). The court also held that a physician is not liable
for using a form of treatment which has been adopted by a respectable minority of the
profession. Id. at 294.
2. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160. 165 (Tex. 1977).
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Every physician treating a patient is required to conform to a standard
of care.' This standard requires that a physician have a reasonable degree
of skill, and that he exercise that skill with ordinary care in the diagnosis
or treatment of the patient.' Historically, the doctrine has been qualified
5
by the "locality rule" and the "same school rule." Under the locality rule,
a physician need only exercise that degree of skill possessed by doctors in
his community or in a similar one.' The "same school rule," which today
could more aptly be considered the "same medical specialty rule," requires
that a medical practitioner exercise the ordinary skill possessed by others
in his same school or specialty of practice.7 With these somewhat eroded
3. See Edwards v. United States, 519 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir. 1975) (physician required
to exercise degree of skill ordinarily possessed by other members of the profession), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 972 (1976); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967) (failure of
physician to conform to medical standards in obtaining patient's consent); Turner v. Stoker,
289 S.W. 190, 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1926, writ refd) (physician under duty to
exercise that degree of care possessed and exercised by other practitioners in good standing).
See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 161-66 (4th ed. 1971);
McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 558-60 (1959).
4. See Graham v. Gautier, 21 Tex. 112, 120 (1858) (physician required to exercise degree
of skill ordinarily possessed by other members of the profession); Bowles v. Bourdon, 213
S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1948) (physician exercising ordinary care and
diligence not responsible for mistake in judgment), aff'd, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949);
Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice, 11 Hous. L. REV. 1, 22 (1973).
5. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 32, at 163-64 (4th ed. 1971).
6. Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 836 (S.D. Tex. 1972), a/Pd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); Rose v. Friddell, 423 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1967, writ refd n.r.e.); Levermann v. Cartall, 393 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1965, writ refd n.r.e.). But see King v. Flamm, 442 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1969). In
holding a general practitioner to the standard of care of a reasonably prudent general practitioner under the .same or similar circumstances, the court omitted reference to the same
or a similar community. Id. at 681; accord, Christian v. Jeter, 445 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1969, writ refd n.r.e.) (reasons for locality rule have disappeared with advent
of modern transportation and communication); Symposium-A Study of Medical Malpractice
in Texas, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 732, 736 (1976). Formerly, a physician was required to exercise
only that degree of skill possessed by other practitioners in his community. Subsequently,
the rule was extended to include communities similar to those of the defendant physician.
Recent cases, however, indicate that the locality rule is no longer strictly followed. Id. at 74446.
7. See, e.g., Karp. v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 420, 423 (5th Cir.) (thoracic surgeon), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Tex. 1965) (surgeon);
Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 5, 219 S.W.2d 779, 782 (1949) (general practitioner); Welch
v. Shaver, 351 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (osteopath).
There are, however, two exceptions to the doctrine. First, a doctor's conduct is not required
to be measured by the standard of care exercised by other physicians of his same school of
practice where the subject of inquiry is common to other schools of practice, and second,
where the subject of inquiry relates to the manner of use of electrical appliances which are of
common use in two or more schools of practice. See Puryear v. Porter, 153 Tex. 82, 87, 262
S.W.2d 933, 936 (1953).
Some jurisdictions apply a third corollary to the standard, holding that physicians are
obligated to keep abreast of progress within the profession. E.g., Naccarato v. Grob, 180
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qualifications, negligence has been defined as a failure to use that degree

of care that physicians of ordinary knowledge and skill would have used
in the diagnosis or treatment of patients, under the same or similar circumstances.' In order to hold a physician liable for want of the requisite degree

of care, Texas courts have consistently required expert medical testimony
to determine how a reasonable and prudent physician would have acted
under the same or similar circumstances.'
The negligence of physicians can be divided into the following categories: failure to make a correct diagnosis,"0 negligent administration of
treatment," failure to make a reasonable disclosure of risks incident to a
proposed form of treatment, failure to consult a specialist," and undertaking a method of treatment that is improper or unnecessary.' In medical
N.W.2d 788, 791 (Mich. 1970) (practicing specialist must treat patients "in light of present
day scientific knowledge"); Smith v. Yohe, 194 A.2d 167, 170 (Pa. 1963) (failure to take Xrays in treatment of fractured hip); Kelly v. Carroll, 219 P.2d 79, 85 (Wash.) (doctor may
not take refuge in the practices of the medical dark ages), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950);
see D. LouisaLL & H. WiLLjm&s, 1 MEDICAL MALPRACcE 8.05, at 209 (1973).
8. Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 836 (S.D. Tex. 1972), affd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); see Burks v. Meredith, 546 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1976, writ refd n.r.e.) (general practitioner not responsible for error in judgment
if he exercises the care and skill of other physicians similarly situated); Allison v. Blewett,
348 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (negligence of physician
consists of failing to do something he should have done under the circumstances).
9. See Edwards v. United States, 519 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir. 1975) (in treating diabetes), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 972 (1976); King v. Flamm, 442 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tex. 1969)
(failure to consult a specialist); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967) (failure to
make reasonable disclosure of risks incident to an operation). An exception to the requirement
of expert testimony has been recognized where the injuries sustained are within the common
knowledge of laymen. Harle v. Krchnak, 422 S.W.2d 810, 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (sponge left in body of patient after surgery); Nicodeme v.
Bailey, 243 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (expert testimony not required where doctor neglects to diagnose patient before administering treatment).
10. E.g., Bender v. Dingwerth, 425 F.2d 378, 379 (5th Cir. 1970) (failure to diagnose heart
disease); Prestegord v. Glenn, 441 S.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Tex. 1969) (failure to correctly diagnose post-operative complication); Levermann v. Cartall, 393 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1965, writ refd n.r.e.) (failure to correctly diagnose a head injury).
11. Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tex. 1965) (negligence in performing back
operation); Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 5, 219 S.W.2d 779, 782 (1949) (negligence in
treating elbow fracture).
12. See Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967). Although earlier informed
consent cases were tried on a theory of assault and battery, this case held that failure to
disclose reasonable risks incident to an operation properly may be treated as negligence
actions. Id. at 302; accord, Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 686 (R.I. 1972); ZeBarth v.
Swedish Hosp., 499 P.2d 1, 10 (Wash. 1972); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 313 (Wis.
1973).
13. King v. Flamm, 442 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tex. 1969) (general practitioner's failure to
consult internist); Burks v. Meredith, 546 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (general practitioner's failure to consult surgeon).
14. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 251 F.2d 103, 108-09 (4th Cir. 1958) (unnecessary operation to
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malpractice cases involving an allegation that the form of treatment was
improper, at least four different standards have been applied.' Courts
adopting the "respectable minority" standard generally have held that
where there is more than one possible method of treatment a doctor will
not be liable for a patient's injuries as long as the treatment employed is
followed by a respectable minority of the profession." The considerable
number standard, a slightly different test, dictates that where competent
medical authority is divided as to the proper manner of treatment in a
particular case, a physician will not be liable for malpractice if he adopts
a mode of treatment advocated by a "considerable number" of physicians. 7 A few early cases applied a much stricter test, holding that a doctor
is liable for "any variance" from a generally accepted manner of treatment.' 8 More recently, several jurisdictions have maintained that when
"reasonable physicians would disagree" as to the best of several modes of
treatment, a physician who uses his best judgment will not be liable for
negligence, even though it may later prove that he was mistaken.",
In Hood v. Phillips"'there was no claim that the surgery was unskillfully
or negligently performed, nor was it alleged that the diagnosis of emphysema was incorrect. Rather, the plaintiff's claim was predicated upon the
contention that this particular surgical procedure was not a proper one.2 '
remove piece of metal from neck); Hoglin v. Brown, 481 P.2d 458, 461 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)
(unnecessary exploratory surgery).
15. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 164-65 (Tex. 1977).
16. See, e.g., Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. Ariz. 1967) (mode of treatment
adopted by sixty-five physicians in country held to constitute respectable minority); Baldor
v. Rogers, 81 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1954) (difference of opinion in treatment of cancer); Dahl
v. Wagner, 151 P. 1079, 1080 (Wash. 1915) (difference in medical opinion as to treatment of
bone dislocation). Two jurisdictions have held the test to be whether the method of treatment
employed was followed by a "respectable portion" of the medical profession. See Walkenhorst
v. Kesler, 67 P.2d 654, 668 (Utah 1937); Smith v. Beard, 110 P.2d 260, 270 (Wyo. 1941).
17. See, e.g., Fritz v. Parke-Davis & Co., 152 N.W.2d 129, 131 (Minn. 1967) (difference
of medical opinion in treatment of epilepsy); Duckworth v. Bennett, 181 A. 558, 559 (Pa. 1935)
(competent medical authority divided as to treatment of patient's hip injury); Gresham v.
Ford, 241 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tenn. 1951) (difference in medical opinion as to proper treatment
of patient's injured arm). The court in Schueler v. Strelinger, 204 A.2d 577, 585 (N.J. 1964)
held the test to be whether the form of treatment adopted had "substantial support" within
the medical profession.
18. See Jackson v. Burnham, 39 P. 577, 580 (Colo. 1895) (physician who departs from
accepted mode of treatment does so at his peril); Allen v. Voje, 89 N.W. 924, 931 (Wis. 1902)
(departure from approved methods will render physician liable notwithstanding that new
method might be improved one).
19. See, e.g., Graham v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 201 F.2d 423, 426 (3d Cir.) (disagreement as to
proper treatment of hernia), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953); Ricket v. Hayes, 511 S.W.2d
187, 194 (Ark. 1974) (disagreement as to proper treatment of fractured jaw); Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo. 1967) (disagreement among physicians in treatment of heart
disease).
20. 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977).
21. Id. at 164.
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Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court was presented with the unique question of what standard applies to a negligence suit based on allegations that
the form of medical treatment was not a proper remedy for the diagnosed
condition.2" In formulating its decision, the court reviewed the various
standards applied by other jurisdictions.23 It concluded that the
"reasonable and prudent doctor" standard would best serve the objective
of protecting the competent and careful physician and permitting a cause
of action against one who is not."4 Further, the test adopted was felt to be
most compatible with certain policy considerations. The court recognized
the importance of allowing physicians to exercise their professional judgment in selecting a method of treatment"3 and noted the importance of
experimentation in order to achieve medical progress."
The court expressed concern that the "respectable minority" and the
"considerable number" standards might convey to the factfinder the incorrect notion that malpractice is to be determined by a poll of the medical
profession. 7 Conceivably, under the respectable minority test a physician
could adopt a method of treatment that has either been rejected by the
medical profession or has become outmoded," provided a respectable minority of practitioners follow the same procedure." The same argument
could apply equally against the considerable number test, for a physician
undertaking an outmoded or rejected form of treatment would likewise be
shielded from liability if he could establish that a considerable number of
physicians use the same method of treatment. 0 Under the reasonable and
prudent doctor standard adopted in Hood such a result would be unlikely.
The number of physicians who employ a particular method of treatment
would be immaterial; rather, liability would depend on whether the form
of treatment undertaken is an acceptable procedure in light of the means
available to the physician,' the health of the patient, and the state of
22. Hood v. Philips, 537 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976), aff'd on
other grounds, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977).
23. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 164-65 (Tex. 1977).
24. Id. at 165.
25. Id. at 165.
26. Id. at 165.
27. Id. at 165.
28. Although the instant case involves the sole issue of "rejected" mode of treatment,
the court expressly held that the standard would apply whether the "form of treatment is
experimental, outmoded, or rejected." Id. at 165.
29. See Dahl v. Wagner, 151 P. 1079, 1080 (Wash. 1915) (doctor not liable for negligence
if treatment employed is followed by respectable minority of practitioners, despite fact that
more modern methods of treatment are available); Comment, Unnecessary Surgery: Doctor
and Hospital Liability, 61 Gzo. L.J. 807, 813-14 n.39 (1973).
30. See Duckworth v. Bennett, 181 A. 558 (Pa. 1935) (court refused to find the defendant
negligent for failure to use an X-ray in treatment of a patient's fractured hip).
31. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977); see Webb v. Jorns, 488 S.W.2d
407, 411 (Tex. 1972) (rural physician not required to possess the skills or resources of sophisticated clinic). Although the court does not expressly abandon the locality rule, the holding in
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medical knowledge." This objective standard should discourage the utilization of "outmoded" or "rejected" methods, and thereby encourage physicians to keep abreast of current developments within the profession. 4
A situation closely analogous to the instant case is one involving experimental medicine. Although traditionally categorized as a separate basis of
liability, experimental cases pose the related question of what standard
should be applied to a malpractice action based on an assertion that the
method of treatment undertaken was an untried and hence unacceptable
procedure.35 Early cases held that a physician who used experimental
methods did so at his peril. 3 Recently, however, one court has rejected this
doctrine.31 In Karp v. Cooley3 the defendant made medical history when
he implanted the first totally mechanical heart in an individual. The patient died shortly thereafter, giving rise to a malpractice suit based on an
allegation of experimentation. A unanimous court reasoned that an action
for experimentation should be measured by conventional malpractice standards." Thus, it was held that in order to prove a physician guilty of
actionable experimentation, expert testimony must establish how a reasonable and prudent doctor would have acted under the same or similar
circumstances.' 0
The impracticability of allowing one test for cases involving experimenthe instant case is in accord with other jurisdictions which treat locality as merely one factor
to be considered in applying the standard of care. See, e.g., Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d
793, 798 (Mass. 1968); Tallbull v. Whitney, 564 P.2d 162, 165-66 (Mont. 1977); Pederson v.
Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (Wash. 1967).

32. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977); see McCoid, The Care Required
of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549 (1959). Courts generally have been more
lenient in allowing experimentation when the patient is near death or seriously ill and ac-

cepted methods have proved unsuccessful. Id. at 581-86.
33. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977); see Naccarato v. Grob, 180
N.W.2d 788, 791 (Mich. 1970) (practicing specialist must treat patients "in light of present
day scientific knowledge"); Smith v. Yohe, 194 A.2d 167, 170 (Pa. 1963) (failure to take Xrays in treatment of fractured hip); Hodgson v. Bigelow, 7 A.2d 338, 342 (Pa. 1939) (failure
to administer tetanus shot to patient who had sustained a cut).
34. See Comment, Unnecessary Surgery: Doctor and Hospital Liability, 61 GEo. L.J.
807, 813 (1973) (doctor neglecting to keep abreast of current surgical procedures has breached
duty to practice as a reasonable physician).
35. See Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice,11 Hous. L. REV. 1, 21 (1973).
36. See, e.g., Owens v. McCleary, 281 S.W. 682, 685 (Mo. 1926) (law does not tolerate
experimentation by physicians); Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488, 524 (1871) (departure from
established mode of treatment renders physician liable for injury resulting therefrom), rev'd
on other grounds, 50 N.Y. 696 (1872); Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862-63 (1767) (novel
method of treating facture); Note, Torts: Physiciansand Surgeons: Malpractice:Liability for
Medical Experimentation, 40 CAL. L. Rav. 159, 161 (1952).
37. Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423 (5th Cir.) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 845 (1974).
38. Id. at 408.
39. Id. at 423-24.
40. Id. at 423.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol9/iss3/16

6

Riklin: Physician Not Liable for Undertaking Particular Mode of Treatment

1978]

CASE NOTES

tation and a different test for cases involving improper mode of treatment
has been perceived in an argument against adoption of the respectable
minority standard." Under this dichotomy a doctor could be absolved from
liability if a form of treatment was experimental or a respectable minority
of physicians supported it." Since the question of what constitutes a respectable minority remains unsettled, 3 a problem lies in determining at
what point a new procedure ceased being experimental, and became one
followed by a respectable minority." Consequently, a physician undertaking a form of treatment that can no longer be considered experimental does
so at his peril, unless he can establish that a respectable minority of practitioners have adopted such a procedure.'" Progress and innovation in medical science could thereby be discouraged.'4 Similarly, the more rigid "any
of encouraging experivariance" test would be inconsistent with the policy
7
mentation in order to achieve medical progress.'
In adopting the reasonable and prudent doctor standard, 4 the Texas
Supreme Court avoided the anomalous situation of having a different test
for experimental medicine than for other malpractice cases where an improper form of treatment is alleged. Moreover, the holding is in accord with
the more recent cases in other jurisdictions, which also have recognized the
importance of allowing physicians a wide range in the exercise of their
41. Hood v. Phillips, 537 S.W.2d 291, 296-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976) (dissenting opinion), af/'d on other grounds, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977).
42. Id. at 296.
43. See Hood v. Phillips, 537 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976) (problem with the standard is in defining what constitutes a respectable minority), aff'd on other
grounds, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977); Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. Ariz. 1967)
(mode of treatment adopted by 65 physicians in country held to constitute respectable minority).
44. Hood v. Phillips, 537 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976) (dissenting
opinion), aff'd on other grounds, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977).
45. Id. at 296. The identical argument could be made against adoption of the considerable number test, for until a considerable number of physicians employed a new form of
treatment, liability would arise once it ceased being experimental.
46. Id. at 296.
47. See Allen v. Voje, 89 N.W. 924, 931 (Wis. 1902) (departure from approved methods
will render physician liable, even though such a departure represents an improved procedure).
48. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977). The court omitted the qualification requiring a physician to possess only that degree of skill as others in his same school of
practice. Thus, although the rule was not expressly rejected, the holding implicitly recognizes
the fact that the same school doctrine is of minimal importance today. See Drummond v.
Hodges, 417 S.W.2d 740, 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ) (osteopaths and allopaths
study same textbooks and are required to take same state examination in order to obtain a
license); Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice, 11 Hous. L. REv. 1 (1973). The
author points out that since medical schools throughout the country teach the same procedures, and licensing requirements are uniform nationwide, most cases will come under the
exception which precludes application of the rule where the subject of inquiry is common to
other schools of practice. Id. at 31-32.
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